Since a single photon source is not available for practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems nowadays, weak coherent state are widely used in practical systems which suffers from the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. Fortunately, the decoy state method is proposed to defeat it, in which there is an important assumption that the signal state and decoy state is not distinguishable for Eve. However, in practical systems, this assumption is invalid in some situations, then the security of decoy state method will be compromised. Actually, a wavelength-selected PNS (WSPNS) is proposed by our group to break the security of decoy state "plug-and-play" QKD systems by exploiting the imperfection of the intensity modulator (IM) that used to generate the signal state and decoy state. Our analysis shows that Eve can use our attack to determinately distinguish the signal state and decoy state, then the security of decoy state method is broken.
time shift appears in several kinds of intensity modulators used in Decoy-State method, such as electro-absorption modulator and acousto-optic modulator. Secondly, similar results can be obtained in the other decoy state method, since different frequency shift will be introduced for different light intensities, which corresponds to different decoy states.
Of course, WSPNS attack is not omnipotent for breaking the security of decoy state method, but only fits to beat decoy state "plug-and-play" QKD systems since Eve must perform time shift to introduce frequency shift. However, we demonstrate for the first time that Decoy-State method itself may introduce another loophole while it has closed the loophole of multi-photon pulses. Commonly, any improved protocol for patching loopholes may introduce other new loopholes while it has closed the existent ones. Thus, we will never be too careful to proof the security of an improved protocol for patching existent loopholes. We believe that our finding is valuable for improving the security of practical QKD.
